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11 Introduction
Reciprocity is a pervasive feature of labor relations. Workers care about fairness and are
willing to reward a generous wage o®er by their employer with a commensurate level of
e®ort, even though providing e®ort by itself is costly and yields no immediate pecuniary
bene¯ts. Firms, in turn, understand the worker's propensity to reciprocate and take into
account the e®ects of compensation on e®ort and productivity when setting wages. These
are the lessons of a vast body of empirical evidence ranging from surveys by Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler (1987) or Bewley (1999) to laboratory experiments by Fehr and Falk
(1999) or Fehr and GÄ achter (2002), to name just a few.
In this paper, we build a general equilibrium e±ciency wage model founded on reci-
procity. Our model is inspired by Rabin's (1993) introduction of fairness in game theory.
Workers are assumed to face a trade-o® between the disutility of providing e®ort and
the psychological bene¯t of reciprocating the gift of a wage o®er above some reference
level. The gift of the ¯rm is de¯ned in terms of the standard component of workers'
utility; and the gift of the workers in terms of the net pro¯ts of the ¯rm. Firms, modeled
as monopolistic competitors, only care for net pro¯ts but, understanding the bene¯t to
be derived from a cooperative workplace, they take workers' propensity to supply e®ort
into account (as e®ort cannot be contracted on directly).
Quite naturally, the wage reference in light of which a worker gauges a given wage
o®er and decides on his e®ort level is a weighted average of his outside option, on the
one hand, and the ¯rm's pro¯tability, on the other. As a result, the wage that elicits
the optimal level of e®ort depends on expected earnings outside the ¯rm (notably the
employment and unemployment rates, the wage paid by competitors and the level of
unemployment compensation) and the ¯rm's ability to pay (captured by output per
worker).
The wage setting behavior of the ¯rms in our economy accords well with the message
of the experimental and survey studies cited in our ¯rst paragraph. These studies indeed
emphasize that both workers and ¯rms view rent-sharing as an important determinant
of the supply of e®ort: the better (worse) the ¯rm is doing, the more (less) the worker
expects to be paid in exchange for a given level of e®ort. Our model also rationalizes
the results of panel data estimations, which consistently ¯nd various measures of ¯rm
performance to be signi¯cant and quantitatively important predictors of wages, even
in the long run and after controlling for skill, working conditions, local labor market
attributes and union presence.1
1Blanch°ower et al. (1990), Abowd et al. (2002). Section 2 reviews this evidence.
2We trace the impact of di®erent macroeconomic shocks on the equilibrium of our
economy. The results reveal that our reciprocity-based perspective on rent-sharing has
the potential to resolve some of the outstanding puzzles in the theory of economic °uc-
tuations. First, the rent-sharing component in the reference wage is shown to contribute
an important element of asymmetry in the way the economy reacts to di®erent types of
shocks. In response to technology shocks (given °exible prices), wages and labor pro-
ductivity are relatively °exible. This is because both elements of the wage reference,
the workers' outside option and ¯rm pro¯tability, are directly a®ected by the shock. In
response to demand shocks (given ¯xed prices), however, wages and labor productivity
react much less or even become countercyclical. The reason is that, as ¯rms cut employ-
ment, the marginal return to labor and thus output per worker increases, thus preventing
the wage reference from falling. This result accords well with a number of econometric
studies using structural vector autoregressions. For example, Blanchard (1989), Gamber
and Joutz (1997) and Fleischman (1999) all report that, conditional on demand shocks,
real wages are acyclical or even slightly countercyclical.
Our results also show that the larger the weight of rent sharing in the wage reference,
the more adjustments to shocks are in terms of employment and the less in terms of wages.
At the opposite, if the reference is purely external, wages are highly procyclical and
substantially more variable than employment. Hence, our revisiting of the gift-exchange
paradigm naturally and structurally gets at one of the most vexing issue in dynamic
labor market models: the wage-employment puzzle. The intuition is straightforward.
In the external perspective, the wage reference depends positively on outside earnings
opportunities. In general equilibrium, these variables are sensitive to aggregate shocks.
For example, when ¯rms reduce employment in response to a downward shift in labor
demand, the general equilibrium fall of the wage reference makes it optimal for individual
¯rms to lower their wages. This leads to a further decrease in the reference wage and thus
makes it possible for ¯rms to propose an even lower wage without severe consequences
on e®ort. By contrast, in the internal reference case, a reduction in the ¯rm's payroll
due to a labor demand shift increases earnings per unit of labor and thus the wage
reference. Optimizing with respect to e®ort therefore results in ¯rms operating along
a negatively sloped wage setting curve. Furthermore, shocks to productivity not only
shift the labor demand curve (as is the case in the external reference case) but also the
wage setting curve. This shift neutralizes (part of) the wage °uctuation and implies that
aggregate shocks potentially have a strong e®ect on employment while leaving real wages
and productivity largely unchanged.
Finally, our model has interesting implications for the cyclical behavior of e®ort. With
3a reference wage depending on both rent-sharing and outside option, e®ort is procyclical
in response to a technology shock and acyclical in response to a demand shock. There
are two forces behind this result. First, workers ¯nd it worthwhile to supply extra e®ort
in times where productivity is high. Second, it is optimal for ¯rms to increase their wage
more than proportionally in response to increases in productivity or in workers' outside
option. The asymmetry in the cyclical behavior of labor productivity then translates
into an asymmetry in the cyclical response of e®ort.
The rent-sharing implication of our model stands in contrast with the traditional fair
wage literature. Originally proposed by Akerlof (1982) under the name of partial gift
exchange, this literature has almost uniformly modeled e®ort supply as a reduced-form
function that depends on the wage rate relative to expected earning opportunities outside
the ¯rm. Akerlof's reduced form e®ort function can be viewed as a particular case of the
structural supply of e®ort in our model under the extreme, yet counterfactual, assump-
tion that workers do not care for the ¯rm's ability to pay. In this purely external case,
¯rms set optimal wages independently of their ¯nancial situation and the macroeconomic
consequences of their behavior (including highly °exible equilibrium wages) are indistin-
guishable from those obtained in more conventional formulations of e±ciency wages such
as Shapiro and Stiglitz' (1984) shirking model or Salop's (1979) labor turnover theory.
A small number of studies departing from Akerlof's original fair wage model are
worth mentioning. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) assume that the worker's reference wage
depends in part on peer wages in the same ¯rm in order to explain unemployment and
wage dispersion. Collard and De la Croix (2000) and Danthine and Kurmann (2004)
introduce past compensation in the de¯nition of the reference wage. They show that
doing so may lead to signi¯cant real wage rigidity and ampli¯ed propagation of exogenous
shocks. None of these studies consider rent-sharing, however, nor do they o®er an explicit
derivation of their e®ort function from a utility maximizing framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the empirical evidence
on reciprocity in labor relations and rent-sharing. Section 3 presents our reciprocity-
based e±ciency wage model. Section 4 discusses the macroeconomic implications of the
model in response to exogenous supply and demand shocks. Section 5 compares our
wage setting curve with the wage behavior arising from a search and matching context
before concluding.
42 Empirical evidence on reciprocity and rent sharing
One of the most important ¯ndings in experimental economics is that many individuals
are willing to spend considerable resources to reward (punish) fair (unfair) behavior by
others even though no direct material gain derives from such action. One experiment
close to our e±ciency wage model is conducted by Fehr and Falk (1999).2 Individuals
are either assigned the role of a worker or a ¯rm manager. The results show that if e®ort
cannot be contracted in advance, the average wage chosen by the ¯rm is considerably
higher than the reservation wage of the worker, even though competitive bidding should
push the equilibrium remuneration down to the worker's reservation wage. Workers in
the experiment often try to underbid in order to obtain a job, but managers consistently
refuse. This choice turns out to be rational because hired workers on average reciprocate
the favor of a high wage with high e®ort (even though providing e®ort is costly), thus
increasing the ¯rm's pro¯t relative to a low-wage / low-e®ort policy.
The hypothesis that reciprocity is an important element in labor relations also re-
ceives strong support from ¯eld studies such as Levine (1993), Campbell and Kamlani
(1997) and Bewley (1999) who survey U.S. company managers and labor leaders about
wage policy.3 Most respondents in these studies report favoring layo®s over wage cuts
during downturns because the negative e®ect of wage cuts on work morale, and thus on
productivity, would outweigh the associated cost savings.
Interestingly, managers in Bewley's survey generally dismiss the shirking theory of
e±ciency wages. Rather than promoting a high e®ort level, the threat of punishment if
caught shirking (in the form of ¯ring or of a wage penalty) creates a negative workplace
atmosphere that is counterproductive. Bewley concludes from his inquiry that Akerlof's
(1982) partial gift exchange hypothesis of e±ciency wages is the explanation for wage
rigidity that is most consistent with empirical evidence. This view also receives strong
support from an experiment by Fehr and GÄ achter (2002). Their setup is similar to the
one of Fehr and Falk discussed above, but with the addition that ¯rm managers can
make workers pay a ¯ne if the latter are caught shirking (which occurs with a ¯xed
probability). Except for very low wage o®ers, workers in this setting provide much lower
e®ort than in the original experiment where no veri¯cation of shirking is allowed.
The notion of reciprocity in labor relations is not operational until the relevant ref-
erences considered by workers when deciding on e®ort are identi¯ed. In a famous study,
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986) shed light on this issue by interviewing a ran-
2Other experiments that simulate similar worker-employer relationships are Fehr, Kirchsteiger and
Riedl [1993] or GÄ achter and Falk [2002]. See Fehr and GÄ achter [2000] for a general survey.
3See Bewley (2002) for a summary.
5domly selected sample of individuals on their perception of fairness of alternative ¯rm
actions in di®erent pro¯t situations. They report that a substantial proportion of indi-
viduals consider the principle of dual entitlement to be an important standard of fairness:
workers are entitled to a reference salary, while ¯rms are entitled to a reference pro¯t.
Accordingly, a wage reduction is more likely to be judged unfair if it results in a gain for
the ¯rm than if it permits averting a loss.4
The importance of rent-sharing considerations in the management of e®ort is largely
con¯rmed in an experiment by Fehr, GÄ achter and Kirchsteiger (1997). Firms in this
experiment are assigned di®erent levels of pro¯tability and make (costly) wage o®ers to
workers. Workers are then given the choice in a randomly determined order to accept
wage o®ers. Once workers accept an o®er, they observe the pro¯tability of their ¯rm
and decide on the level of (costly) e®ort they want to provide. The results are striking:
workers consistently o®er high e®ort in return for a high wage. Firms, in turn, seem
to understand the negative (suboptimal) e®ect of inadequate rent sharing on e®ort and
o®er wages that are increasing in the level of pro¯tability assigned; i.e. they pay pure
job rents.
By construction, these studies on rent sharing focus on very speci¯c references and
may therefore miss other elements considered by workers in their evaluation of fairness.
In particular, employees may pay attention to outside references such as wages paid for
similar jobs at other ¯rms or local unemployment rates. The aforementioned survey
studies (Levine (1993), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Bewley (1999)) suggest that
this is not the case: workers' morale rather depends on ¯rm-internal references such
as established pay traditions, the ¯rm's ability to pay, the di®erence between current
and past wages, and the compensation of peer workers in the same ¯rm. Importantly,
according to the surveyed managers, even in cases of high unemployment, substantial
reductions in pay are possible only in situations of great ¯nancial distress when wage
reductions are the only way to prevent the ¯rm from going bankrupt or laying o® a
large fraction of its workforce. Bewley (2002, page 7) goes even further and argues that
"...employees usually have little notion of a fair or market value for their services and
quickly come to believe that they are entitled to their existing pay, no matter how high
it may be....workers do not use pay rates at other ¯rms as reference wages, for they
know too little about them. Exceptions to this statement may occur when workers are
4The idea of dual entitlement is closely related to Adam's (1963) theory of equity and Blau -Homan
(1955, 1961) theory of social exchange. Both theories hypothesize that the rewards of an exchange (here
between ¯rms and workers) should be proportional to the perceived value of the di®erent parties' inputs.
Numerous studies in psychology and sociology have attempted to test these theories and report overall
strongly supportive results. See Akerlof and Yellen (1990) for a review of this evidence.
6represented by an active union that keeps them informed about what other ¯rms pay."5
Furthermore, most managers in Bewley's survey responded that they do not take into
consideration underbidding by job applicants, thus closing o® an indirect channel through
which external references could possibly a®ect average ¯rm pay.
We do not wish to argue here that references external to the ¯rm are completely
irrelevant to the worker's e®ort decision. In fact, Bewley's conclusion simply suggests
that workers often have only incomplete information on their earnings potential outside
the ¯rm. But it is clear that the ¯rm's ability to pay and established rent-sharing tradi-
tions are non-negligible references in workers' perception of fairness. While incomplete
information (e.g., about the ¯rm's revenues) may be relevant here as well, this conclusion
should be robust provided some learning about the relevant variable is taking place.
Additional evidence in favor of rent-sharing in general comes from a rich set of mi-
croeconometric studies on the sources of wage dispersion. Starting with Slichter (1950),
a long line of studies { from Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers (1988)
for the U.S.; Blanch°ower, Oswald and Garrett (1990), Nickell and Wadhwani (1990),
Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) or Hildreth and Oswald (1997) for European labor mar-
kets; and Christo¯des and Oswald (1992) or Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for Canada {
document that wages for apparently identical jobs di®er signi¯cantly across industries,
and that these di®erences are remarkably robust over time and across countries. Based
on the evidence, they argue that these wage di®erentials cannot be attributed entirely
to di®erences in skill or working conditions. Rather, di®erences in compensation depend
to a substantial part on the ¯rm's ability to pay, even in sectors where unions do not
play an important role.6
Murphy and Topel (1987) challenge the rent-sharing view and argue instead that
5Bewley's observation that unions act as an information source accords with studies by Agell and
Lundborg [1995, 1999] and Agell and Bennmarker [2004] who survey managers of Swedish companies
about wage determination. In line with Bewley, many of their respondents indicate that wage claims
are a®ected by pro¯ts and the ¯rm's ability to pay. However, and in contrast to the responses of U.S.
companies, Swedish managers gave larger support to the view that ¯rm-external information such as
unemployment and wages at other ¯rms also matter for wage determination. Agell and Bennmarker
try to assess whether this di®erence can be explained by the greater importance of labor unions in
Sweden compared to the U.S. They ¯nd a signi¯cant positive correlation between union density and
the appreciation of the external reference perspective, thus lending further support to the view that
incomplete information is part of the explanation for why workers focus on internal rather than external
wage references.
6As a rough measure of how much industry pro¯ts matter for wage dispersion, Blanch°ower, Oswald
and Sanfey (1996) report a Lester's range of approximately 25% of the mean wage. Lester's range is
de¯ned as four standard deviations of the ¯rm performance variable (i.e. pro¯ts) times the elasticity of
wages with respect to the ¯rm performance variable.
7high-wage individuals get sorted into high-performance ¯rms because of unobserved abil-
ities. The recent availability of large ¯rm-worker matched panel data makes it possible
to assess the relevance of rent-sharing versus the sorting argument. Abowd and Kra-
marz (2000) thus decompose wage data for France and Washington State, respectively,
into observed worker characteristics plus unobserved worker and unobserved ¯rm e®ects.
Their estimates show that the two e®ects are about equally important in explaining wage
disparity. Abowd, Creecy and Kramarz (2002) further report that the correlation be-
tween the two e®ects is slightly negative, a result that appears to contradict the sorting
argument. Finally, Abowd, Kramarz, Margolis and Troske (2001) ¯nd that the unob-
served ¯rm e®ect is strongly and positively correlated with di®erent ¯rm productivity
measures.7
While complementary explanations for rent sharing cannot be ruled out, the reci-
procity view of labor relations features prominently among the potential organizing
principles for the reported evidence. In particular it proposes (i) that reciprocal be-
havior by individuals is central to the ¯rm's management of work e®ort; and (ii) that
the ¯rm's ability to pay is an important factor in workers' perception of a given wage
o®er (and thus of their e®ort decision). The model we now develop rationalizes this
perspective.
3 A reciprocity-based model of e±ciency wages
In line with e±ciency wage theory, we assume that e®ort per unit of labor is an input
to production but ¯rms cannot directly observe the worker's provision of e®ort. Hence,
in contrast with work hours, work e®ort cannot be paid its marginal product. Firms
understand, however, that, while workers dislike e®ort per se, they may derive satisfaction
from reciprocating a generous wage o®er with a commensurate e®ort level. If workers
are fairly treated and work morale is high, workers will voluntarily provide e®ort even
in the absence of monitoring or other material incentives.
7The latter ¯nding is con¯rmed by Arai (2003) who uses ¯rm-worker matched data from Sweden.
Arai's estimates of the wage-pro¯t relation are sizable and stable across unionized vs. non-unionized
workers, blue-collar vs. white-collar workers, and for manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
Interestingly, Arai also introduces controls for worker supervision but ¯nds no signi¯cant change in the
wage-pro¯t relation, thus providing further evidence against the shirking hypothesis.
83.1 The supply of e®ort
Akerlof (1982) in his seminal paper, and several studies thereafter, summarized the fair
wage hypothesis of e±ciency wages via a simple e®ort function of the form
e = e(w;wr); (1)
where e®ort, e, is an increasing function of the wage o®er, w, and a decreasing function
of some reference wage, wr, viewed as \fair" by the worker. While broadly in line with
this general perspective, the model we outline presently seeks explicit foundations for the
functional form linking e®ort with the wage o®er and the wage reference; for the measure
of distance between wage o®er and wage reference; and, above all, for the de¯nition of
the latter. This objective is justi¯ed by the observation, emphasized in what follows,
that the ability of the e±ciency wage perspective to generate signi¯cant rigidity and
endogenous propagation to shocks is very much dependent on the de¯nition of the wage
reference.
Our model is inspired by the more recent literature on reciprocity and its formal-
ization by Rabin (1993). It leads to an optimal condition for e®ort supply (equation
(4)) that could equally well be taken as a reduced form expression for e®ort, i.e., as an
alternative to the representation (1). Our development proceeds in four steps.
Step 1: What provides satisfaction? As in Rabin (1993), we assume that work-
ers' preferences take the form
U = u(c;e) + ¸s(w;e).
The ¯rst component, u(c;e), is standard: it states that utility is derived from consump-
tion, c, while e®ort, e, provides direct disutility (uc > 0, ucc · 0 and ue < 0, uee < 0).
The second component, s(w;e), admits that psychological satisfaction can also arise
from providing e®ort in a work environment characterized by reciprocal behavior. The
parameter ¸ determines the relative importance of reciprocity considerations. In order
to focus our analysis on the supply of e®ort, we abstract from the utility of leisure and
assume instead that workers inelastically supply one unit of labor.
Step 2: Modeling the utility derived from reciprocity. The central idea be-
hind reciprocity is that individuals are willing to spend considerable resources to reward
(punish) fair (unfair) behavior by others (the ¯rm in our case) even though no direct
material gain derives from such action. Rabin formalized this idea by de¯ning s(w;e) as
the product of the respective \gifts" of the worker and the ¯rm
s(w;e) = d(e;¢)g(w;¢).
9The term d(e;¢) represents the gift of the worker towards the ¯rm. It takes the form of
a level of e®ort beyond some reference e®ort level and is measured in terms of its impact
on output per worker. Likewise, the term g(w;¢) represents the gift of the ¯rm. It takes
the form of a wage above some reference level and is measured in terms of its impact on
workers' utility. When workers perceive a wage o®er as generous (i.e. g(w;¢) > 0), their
utility may increase if they reciprocate with a gift of higher e®ort (i.e. d(e;¢) > 0).
With this de¯nition of preferences, workers face a trade-o® between the direct disu-
tility of providing e®ort and the satisfaction derived from reciprocating kind behavior by
the ¯rm. Under reasonable assumptions, this trade-o® results in a positive e®ort level.
Precisely, optimal e®ort is such that the marginal disutility of providing e®ort equals the
marginal \psychological" bene¯t of reciprocating the gift of the ¯rm with a gift of e®ort8
¡ue = ¸deg(w;¢). (2)
We label this equation the \E®ort Condition" (EC). It spells out the amount of e®ort a
worker is willing to supply in response to a certain wage o®er.
Step 3: Measuring the gift of the worker. To make d(e;¢) and g(w;¢) explicit,
we need to specify the functional forms for utility and pro¯ts. We assume that the
utility from consumption and e®ort takes the form u(c;e) = c ¡ eµ with µ > 2; and the
production function takes the form f(en) = A(en)® with 0 < ® < 1:
Given these speci¯cations and continuing in the spirit of Rabin, we now propose a
measure of the gift of the worker. It is the di®erence between realized output per worker,
on the one hand, and output per worker under a reference e®ort level, on the other. The
latter is a weighted average (with weight ¹ and (1 ¡ ¹), respectively) of output per
worker under the maximum possible e®ort level, emax, and output per worker in the case
of minimum possible e®ort, emin, on the other. Given our speci¯cation of utility, we
naturally derive emin = argmaxe(c ¡ eµ) =) emin = 0 and emax = argmine(c ¡ eµ) =)
emax = c1=µ. Since An®¡1e® represents output per worker if e®ort is e, the gift of the
worker to the ¯rm writes
d(e;¢) = An®¡1e® ¡ f¹[An®¡1c®=µ] + (1 ¡ ¹)[0]g
= An®¡1[e® ¡ ¹c®=µ].
Equation (2) makes clear that the only dimension of d(e;¢) that matters is the impact
of the worker's e®ort on the measured gift, that is de. Rabin's formulation has the
property that, because the gift is measured in units of output, a larger e®ort level could
8The typical worker in this model is assumed to be one of a continuum who does not take into account
the impact of his own individual e®ort on the ¯rm's output and on the gift of the ¯rm.
10actually result in a decreased gift in the face of an adverse technology shock. There is
some plausibility in this: a worker may understand that, in bad times when productivity
is low, an extra display of zeal will not be valued by the ¯rm as much as in good times
when productivity is high. In the robustness section, however, we test an alternative
speci¯cation where this e®ect is absent and the gift of the worker is measured directly
in terms of e®ort, as in d(e;¢) = G(e ¡ ¹c1=µ):
Step 4: Measuring the gift of the ¯rm. The gift of the ¯rm is similarly measured
as the di®erence between the utility from consumption under the actual wage o®er and
the utility that would follow under a reference wage, the latter being a weighted average
(with weight ' and (1 ¡ '), respectively) of the maximum and the minimum possible
wage, wmax and wmin. With linear-in-consumption preferences, utility payo®s are mea-
sured in wage units. The ¯rm cannot pay more than y=n or it would go bankrupt. We
assume that wmax = (y=n)º;º < 1. The parameter º < 1 is introduced for two reasons.
One is practical: while it could technically pay a maximum wage of y=n, if º = 1, it will
be impossible for the ¯rm to extend a positive gift, and thus elicit a positive e®ort level,
in the extreme case where ' = 1. Yet, it will turn out to be very convenient to convey
intuition for our results by analyzing the extreme cases where ' = 0 or 1. Furthermore,
a maximum wage lower than y=n is representative of more general formulations where
the production process requires the use of factors of production other than labor, or in
the presence of ¯xed costs.9
A worker always has the option to refuse a wage o®er and \quit". In this case, his
expected remuneration can be measured by ¹ w¹ nb(1¡¹ n), with ¹ w denoting the wage if hired
by another ¯rm, ¹ n the probability of reemployment and b the level of unemployment
bene¯ts which is relevant if the worker is not re-hired. Since we consider a continuum
of identical ¯rms, ¹ w and ¹ n also represent the aggregate level of wages and employment,
respectively (with full employment being normalized to 1). To avoid an asymmetric
impact of variations in the parameter º, the outside option is raised to the same power
as y=n in the maximum wage, that is, we assume the minimum acceptable wage to the
worker is
£
¹ w¹ nb(1¡¹ n)¤º
. This could be representative of a situation where there are costs
to job search. We emphasize that while the º parameter is useful to analyze the case
where ' = 1, none of our results will ultimately depend on the speci¯c value taken by
º (Section 4.3 makes this point). If the wage is lower, the worker is better o® quitting
9It turns out to be important to introduce some curvature in the phrasing of the problem and thus
represent a maximum wage lower than y=n via an exponent º lower than 1, rather than by deducting a
¯xed proportion per worker from y=n. This is because in the latter case both the labor demand and the
wage setting curves are linear in y=n and therefore no well de¯ned interior equilibrium exists.
11(not accepting the wage o®er). With these assumptions, the gift of the ¯rm towards the
worker takes the form:10






+ (1 ¡ ')[ ¹ w¹ nb(1¡¹ n)]º
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, (3)
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(4)
with Q = µ=¸®.
Our formulation of the EC thus integrates two very di®erent perspectives on what
makes workers willing to supply e®ort. Consider ¯rst the case ' = 0. In this perspective,
the wage reference is purely external - it depends only on the worker's outside option -
and the EC subsumes various versions of the e±ciency wage hypothesis. In his original
paper, Akerlof (1982) motivated it as a result of a gift exchange postulating that the
wage reference would correspond to what the worker could earn outside his current
employment relationship. But the same condition could also be viewed as the reduced-
form consequence of the shirking model of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) or of the turnover
model of Salop (1979). In both cases a real wage in excess of the reference wage is what
induces the worker to provide e®ort, because being ¯red, respectively quitting, is thus
made costly to him/her and, in both cases, the natural reference is external because the
alternative is precisely being ¯red or quitting.
The opposite situation is ' = 1. Here what matters is not the conditions of remuner-
ation outside the ¯rm. The sharing of the rent within the ¯rm, between workers and ¯rm
owners, is at the center of attention { a perspective that is very much related to the idea
of reciprocity and the notion of equitable payo®s. In this ¯rm-internal reference view,
workers view the salary o®er in light of the ¯rm's output per employee, y=n. The closer
the actual w is to y=n, the more favorable to the worker is the sharing of the rent and
the more generous the typical worker is of his e®ort; conversely, the farther away from
the maximal wage o®er the actual compensation is, the larger the rent appropriated by
¯rm owners and the lower the forthcoming level of e®ort (ceteris paribus).
3.2 Firm's optimal policy
As discussed above, ¯rms cannot directly observe e®ort. They understand, however, that
workers reciprocate according to the EC in (4). The ¯rm's manager thus makes the ¯rst
10Our analysis is static and therefore it cannot address the issue of incomplete information and learning
touched upon in the previous section. Modeling information frictions in a fully dynamic context is an
obvious natural extension to the present paper. See the concluding section.
12move in the form of a wage o®er which is the result of his estimating (according to (4))
how the o®er will be perceived by the worker and how the worker will react to the gift
of the ¯rm thus manifested.11 Speci¯cally, ¯rms solve
max
w;n Ãf(en) ¡ wn
subject to the e®ort condition in (4). The term Ã represents the inverse of the markup
(i.e. the real marginal cost) that ¯rms apply in monopolistic competition; and f(¢) is












Given the log-linear nature of the production function, we can rewrite fe = fnn=e and
express condition (5) as
w = Ãfn(1 + "e;n), (7)
where "e;n ´ @e=@n¤n=e is the elasticity of e®ort with respect to the ¯rm's labor input.
This equation determines the labor demand. Since "e;n > 0, the marginal condition
requires equating the wage rate to the marginal product of labor (modi¯ed by the real
marginal cost) augmented by the elasticity of e®ort to employment; i.e. ¯rms understand
that hiring more labor reduces output per worker and thus the workers' wage reference.
For a given wage, taking the derived e®ort function into account thus leads to a form of
overemployment in the sense that ¯rms hire more labor than in a standard set-up.13
11Note that the behavior of the ¯rm is entirely rational. Contrary to Rabin's, our formulation of
the problem is thus asymmetrical with a rational ¯rm optimizing in a context where workers display
reciprocal behavior. Our approach thus demonstrates that reciprocity may have important economic
consequences even if one of the players (the ¯rm) only cares about material payo®s. Note as well that,
as opposed to Rabin's, our model allows for continuous decision choices and takes into account general
equilibrium e®ects.
12In perfect competition, marginal cost must equal the price level and hence Ã = 1. In the comparative
statics exercises below, we explicitly refer to a monopolistic product market where ¯rms charge prices
above marginal cost, i.e. Ã < 1.
13This result mirrors Stole and Zwiebel (1996) who develop a model of intra¯rm bargaining where
workers are assumed to enjoy a ¯xed amount of bargaining power and labor productivity is taken to be
the ¯rm's threat point in the wage negociation. An increase in labor therefore reduces the negociated
wage, a fact that leads ¯rms to hire more labor. We thank Etienne Wasmer for pointing out this similarity.
Contrary to Stole and Zwiebel, however, our model does not impose that workers have explicit bargaining
power. Rather, workers have indirect bargaining power in the sense that ¯rms internalize the e®ort
consequence of a low salary. Furthermore, Stole and Zwiebel's equilibrium is one where unemployment
is absent and the wage equals the one obtained in a Walrasian labor market without bargaining.
13Similarly, we can combine conditions (5) and (6) to obtain
"e;w ¡ "e;n = 1. (8)
where "e;w ´ @e=@w¤w=e is the elasticity of workers' e®ort with respect to the wage. We
refer to this equation as the Modi¯ed Solow Condition (MSC). If "e;n = 0, the MSC would
reduce to Solow's (1979) original condition "e;w = 1: the wage rate is optimal if, at the
margin, a 1% increase in wage implies a 1% increase in e®ort. The marginal wage increase
then exactly pays for itself in terms of increased output. This condition is omnipresent in
current e±ciency wage models. In our set-up, however, the traditional Solow condition
no longer holds. This is because a marginal wage increase has an additional (negative)
e®ect on e®ort coming from the induced decrease in employment and the consequent rise
in y=n. Thus, ceteris paribus, the last wage increase warranted in a standard e±ciency
wage context would not pay for itself here.14
3.3 Equilibrium
With homogenous ¯rms and workers, equilibrium implies that wages and employment
are the same for everyone; i.e. w = ¹ w and n = ¹ n. In order to conveniently summarize
our main equilibrium equations, we ¯rst combine (7) with the MSC (8) to obtain, after















We can likewise combine the e®ort function (4) with the MSC (8) to eliminate the e®ort
variable and obtain









where ¹ µ = (µ ¡ 1 ¡ º)=(µ ¡ 2) > 1 and ~ µ = (µ ¡ 1)=(µ ¡ 2) > 1, and we have made the
substitution w = ¹ w and n = ¹ n descriptive of equilibrium. Equation (10) is the aggregate
wage setting curve. It replaces the labor supply equation of standard Walrasian models
and stipulates that the equilibrium wage, designed to elicit optimal e®ort, is increasing in
the ¯rms' productivity, y=n, and the workers expected outside earning option, wnb(1¡n).
14Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991) is a rare reference discussing e±ciency wage models where
the Solow condition fails to hold. They mention the case of a more complex production function and
another one that combines wage bargaining with e±ciency wage considerations. These authors also
brie°y mention the possibility that the workers' goodwill could be in°uenced by the ¯rm's ability to pay.
They do not explore the implications of that hypothesis, however.
14This property is intuitive: an increase in the wage reference, ceteris paribus, forces ¯rms
to increase their own wage o®er. It is an important driver in the comparative statics
results that follow.15 Finally, taking this wage setting equation into account, equilibrium














In equilibrium, y = c (no investment). The equilibrium values of w;n;e;y are im-
plied by the solution to the system formed by the labor demand curve (9), the wage
setting curve (10), the optimal e®ort equation (11), and the production function. The
di®erence between the resulting employment level and the total amount of labor supplied
determines the level of unemployment.
Before closing this section, let us add a few comments on equation (11). This con-
dition describes the result, at equilibrium, of ¯rms' \e®ort management policy". Since
¹ µ > 1 and ~ µ > 1, ¯rms set wages such that e®ort increases with both labor productivity
y=n and the outside option wnb(1¡n). The positive in°uence of the y=n term outside
the square brackets is the result of our modeling choice discussed in section 3.1 (step 3):
workers volunteer e®ort more willingly in situations where ¯rms are highly productive
because the same gift of e®ort yields a larger output increment and is thus more highly
valued by ¯rms in such circumstances. The positive coe±cient on the two components
of the wage reference (inside the brackets) is more surprising. One could have expected
that, when ¯rms are confronted with a tougher competition, in the sense that the wage
reference is higher, they would ¯nd it optimal to increase their own wage o®er (as stip-
ulated by the wage setting curve) but also to accept a decrease in workers' e®ort level
(since the latter is apparently more costly to obtain).
This cannot be the case in our setup. Equation (4) makes clear that e®ort is positive
only if w is larger than the wage reference. This requires that both µ's in (10) are
indeed larger than 1, which delivers the property in question by (11). Thus, a high wage
reference, in general, and a high y=n, in particular, signal a good time to elicit (and to
volunteer) e®ort and e®ort co-moves with these variables over the cycle.
To get a feel for this result, consider Figure 1 depicting the e®ort condition (4) for
the case of a purely external reference.16 The EC is a concave function in the e ¡ w
space. An increase in the wage reference corresponds to a rightward translation of this
15The similarity between this wage setting equation and the one obtained in a search and matching
context will be taken up in our concluding comments.
16For clarity we abstract from the y=n term outside the square bracket in (11). The argument made
for one extreme case would hold in the other extreme case as well although the shape of the EC curve
would not be identical and the MSC rather than the SC would have to be invoked.
15concave curve with unchanged slope @e=@w for any given e level. Concavity then implies
that tangency with a ray from the origin of slope e=w must occur at a higher e level
(point C rather than B). Thus, for the SC to obtain, the ¯rm must increase its wage
o®er in order to elicit this higher e®ort level. While we cannot claim that this result
would prevail for any change in our functional forms, it is more robust than the initial
intuition would suggest. Indeed, given that the EC curve is a concave function of the
premium of the wage over the reference wage, a property that itself follows from the
highly plausible assumption that the marginal disutility of e®ort is increasing (uee < 0),
a negative or zero correlation between e®ort and the wage reference would obtain only
if changes in the wage reference were to signi¯cantly modify the shape of the EC curve
(with a rightward shift being associated with an increase in the curvature).
To summarize, whatever its de¯nition, an increase in the wage reference robustly
leads ¯rms to increase their wage o®er. This implies that optimal e®ort adjusts to a
level such that the marginal wage change elicits a smaller e®ort response (e=w lower
implies @e=@w lower by the SC). In the absence of major changes in the shape of the
EC, concavity means that the new e®ort level is higher. If, in addition, the increase
in the wage reference comes from a rise in y=n, the impact of a given gift of e®ort by
workers is larger and they will be more prone to reciprocate. In substance, these two
elements mean that, contrary to intuition, e®ort is not more costly to obtain when the
wage reference is higher.
Figure 1: Illustrating the optimal e®ort condition






















164 Wages, employment and e®ort in the cycle
We now analyze the properties of our reciprocity-based e±ciency wage model. The main
focus is on how rent-sharing considerations a®ect the general equilibrium responses of
wages, employment and e®ort to exogenous shocks. We perform two sets of comparative
statics exercises; the ¯rst involves a technology shock given °exible prices; and the second
deals with a demand shock given ¯xed prices.17
4.1 Comparative statics
The comparative statics analysis is performed with respect to a benchmark equilibrium
whose calibration is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Benchmark calibration
Parameter n ® Ã ½ ' µ v A
Value 0:95 0:66 0:9 0:5 0:5 3 0:75 1
We target a realistic level for equilibrium unemployment of 5%, resulting in an em-
ployment level n = 0:95. This pins down the value of one parameter, in our case ¸, in
terms of the values of the other parameters and n (see the appendix for details). On
grounds of plausibility or following previous studies, we set A = 1 (a pure normalization
without any material consequence), ® = 0:66, Ã = 0:9 (i.e. an equilibrium markup
1=Ã of 11%), and ½ = 0:5 (a replacement ratio of unemployment bene¯ts to equilibrium
wages of 50%). The resulting level of unemployment bene¯ts b is then kept constant
when computing the comparative statics (in line with the observation that b usually
depends on a weighted average of past wages).
As to the calibration of ', recall that ' = 0 corresponds to the situation (privileged
by traditional e±ciency wage models) where workers have a purely external vision of
the reference wage. The case of ' = 1, by contrast, is the one where outside earning
opportunities do not matter and only internal rent-sharing considerations are relevant.
The evidence reviewed in Section 2 supports the view that both these perspectives are
important; we therefore select ' = 0:5 as our benchmark. Since one of our main tasks
17Our ultimate objective is to incorporate a model such as the one developed in Section 3 into a
full-blown dynamic stochastic general equilibrium framework. We refrain from doing so at this stage
because this requires making and justifying a number of additional, non-trivial, modeling choices. The
super-imposed structure would obscure the underlying mechanics of our model and make it harder to
convey the intuition behind our results. We have checked, nevertheless, that all of our conclusions hold
up in a small loglinear New Keynesian framework (the details of this model, and the results, are available
from the authors upon request).
17will be to assess how the model properties depend on ', we will also analyze extensively
the two extreme cases, ' = 0 and ' = 1.
Finally, in the absence of clear guidance on the parameters µ and º, we select µ = 3
(recall that our model requires µ > 2 for the equilibrium to be well-de¯ned) and º = 0:75
for our benchmark and perform extensive robustness tests. Our benchmark calibration
implies an equilibrium labor income share wn=y = 0:58 which is close to the average
labor income share observed in the U.S. over the post-World-War-II period.
Table 2a displays the general equilibrium responses of the model to a 1% decrease
in technology A, given °exible prices. Under this hypothesis, the equilibrium is supply-
determined, aggregate demand absorbs the supply of output forthcoming at the equilib-
rium levels of e®ort and employment, and the markup remains unchanged.
Table 2a: Response of endogenous variables to a 1% technology shock
Value of ' y n w e Ã y=n
0 -2.10 -0.79 -1.32 -0.88 0 -1.32
0.5 -2.27 -1.15 -1.10 -0.78 0 -1.14
1 -2.97 -2.97 0 0 0 0
Table 2b reports the responses following a negative 1% shock in demand y under
the assumption that prices are completely ¯xed. This scenario mimicks a Keynesian
situation where the equilibrium is fully demand-determined and ¯rms have to adjust
their production to exactly match the reduction in demand.
Table 2b: Response of endogenous variables to a 1% demand shock
Value of ' y n w e Ã y=n
0 -1 -0.95 -1.59 -0.55 -1.54 -0.05
0.5 -1 -1.46 -0.31 -0.04 -0.86 0.47
1 -1 -2.19 0.91 0.71 -0.30 1.21
Consider ¯rst the comparative statics for our benchmark calibration ' = 0:5 (second
row of each table). The 1% decrease in A in Table 2a results in a strong decrease in
output (¡2:27%) as the direct e®ect of the fall in productivity is ampli¯ed by a decrease
in both employment (¡1:15%) and e®ort (¡0:78%). The real wage decreases by 1:1%
and the decline in labor productivity y=n is commensurate (¡1:14%).
Turning to the demand shock in Table 2b, output adjusts, by construction, to the new
level of demand (it falls by exactly 1%). Since e®ort barely reacts (-0:04%), the concavity
of the production function implies that ¯rms achieve the required drop in e®ective labor,
en, through a more than proportionate decrease in employment (¡1:46%). Wages, in
18turn, react only modestly (¡0:31%) while labor productivity increases by 0:47%. Finally,
note that as e®ective labor, en, adjusts to its new cost-minimizing level, real marginal
cost, Ã, also decreases from its optimal (°exible price) level (¡0:86%).18
The ¯rst striking aspect of these results is how they di®er across the two shocks.
While both shocks lead to a situation of depressed economic activity, the fall in em-
ployment per unit of output is almost three times as large in response to the demand
shock than in response to the technology shock (¢n=¢y = 1:46 in Table 2b versus
¢n=¢y = 0:51 in Table 2a). Conversely, the relative wage change is smaller in the
demand shock case (¢w=¢y = 0:31 in Table 2b versus ¢w=¢y = 0:49 in Table 2a).
Finally, labor productivity responds in opposite directions (¢(y=n) = :47% in Table 2b
versus ¢(y=n) = ¡1:14% in Table 2a).
This asymmetry is entirely due to the rent sharing element in the wage reference and
the fact that labor productivity reacts in opposite direction under the two shocks. In
the face of a supply shock, y=n falls in equilibrium and so does unambiguously the wage
reference (since workers' outside option also falls). In the case of a demand shock, y=n
increases, thus dampening the fall of the wage reference and the resulting decrease in w
and e.19
The asymmetry in the responses of n and w when rent sharing matters accords
well with the predictions of a number of studies using structural vector autoregressions.
Thus, Gali (1999), Francis and Ramey (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Vigfusson
(2003) ¯nd that the response of employment to a technology shock is initially smaller
than (or even inverse to) the reaction to a demand shock. Independently, Blanchard
(1989), Gamber and Joutz (1997) and Fleischman (1999) all report, based on various
identi¯cation schemes, that conditional on demand shocks, real wages are acyclical (or
even slightly countercyclical) while they are procyclical conditional on technology shocks.
The second interesting dimension of our results is the in°uence of the parameter
'. Reading Tables 2a and 2b from top to bottom, one sees that, whatever the source
of the shock, a stronger emphasis on the internal reference perspective systematically
18As is standard in the New Keynesian literature, our ¯xed price demand shock is su±ciently small
for pro¯ts of the monopolistically competitive ¯rms to remain positive.
19One could suspect that the asymmetry of results is due to the fact the comparative statics for the
technology shock are computed under °exible prices while the comparative statics for the demand shock
are computed under completely ¯xed prices. This is not the case, however. In fact, the asymmetry in
results would be even more extreme if we imposed price ¯xity in the technology shock case: employment
would decrease by a smaller amount or even increase (depending on the degree of accommodation of
monetary policy). The fall in labor productivity and wages would be made even larger as a result. This
outcome is con¯rmed in the small loglinear New Keynesian extension mentioned in footnote 17.
19increases the e®ect on employment and decreases the e®ect on wages. In fact, for ' =
0, the wage reaction to both types of shocks is larger than the employment reaction.
This con¯rms and generalizes the conclusion of Danthine and Donaldson (1990) that
once imbedded in general equilibrium, traditional e±ciency wage models with a purely
external reference vision cannot resolve the wage-employment puzzle. By contrast, for
' = 1; wages become completely acyclical in response to a technology shock and even
countercyclical in response to a demand shock. Reciprocity-based rent-sharing thus
appears as a potentially important source of real wage rigidity.
Finally, the results in Tables 2a and 2b demonstrate that the two perspectives bear
sharply di®erent implications for the behavior of e®ort. Whatever the type of shock,
the case of ' = 0 induces a pro-cyclical reaction of e®ort. In contrast, for ' = 1, e®ort
does not respond to a technology shock while a demand shock induces a strongly counter-
cyclical e®ort response (provoked by the increase in y=n). For the plausible benchmark of
' = 0:5, e®ort is procyclical in response to the technology shock and acyclical in response
to the demand shock. In this case, our model thus o®ers a competing explanation to
Burnside and Eichenbaum's (1996) labor hoarding story for the pro-cyclicity of e®ort. A
pro-cyclical e®ort endows the model economy with an internal ampli¯cation mechanism
and results in a more plausible series for Solow residuals as a measure of technology
shocks. The intuition for these results is developed in details in the next subsection.
4.2 Generating intuition: a further look at the extremes
In order to understand the mechanics behind these results, it is useful to probe further
the two extreme cases, ' = 0 and ' = 1. Table 3 regroups the relevant equilibrium
equations in simpli¯ed form.20
Table 3: Equilibrium equations for extreme values of '
' = 0 ' = 1
WS w = ~ µ
¡
wnb(1¡n)¢º
























Note that the wage setting curve (WS) is the only dimension that clearly set the
two cases apart. But for slightly di®erent slope coe±cients, the labor demand (LD) and
e®ort conditions (EC) have the same form.










204.2.1 Purely External reference
Consider ¯rst the wage setting curve in the purely external wage reference (' = 0):
w = ~ µ[wnb(1¡n)]º: Taking unemployment bene¯ts b as given, there is a direct relationship
between w and n that does not involve other variables. Both technology and demand
shocks therefore result in shifts of the labor demand curve moving the equilibrium along
the wage setting curve. This is why the relative responses of w and n in the ' = 0 case
are perfectly symmetrical and largely independent from the source of the shock. We can
use the elasticity of w with respect to n as a good measure of wage rigidity. With º = 1












For unemployment rates between 5% and 10% and replacement ratios vary between 0:35
and 0:65, we obtain the matrix of elasticities reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Wage employment elasticity when ' = 0
½ = 0:35 ½ = 0:65
n = 0:9 9:45 3:88
n = 0:95 19:95 8:19
Even in the "most favorable" scenario (n = 0:9 and ½ = 0:65), labor demand shifts
wages almost four times as much as employment. The intuition for the absence of wage
rigidity in this case is straightforward. The only reason for ¯rms to hold their wages
constant is if all other ¯rms keep theirs constant. But even if they were to do so, the
decrease in employment that follows a negative shock, in and of itself, decreases the wage
reference. The result is that ¯rms ¯nd it optimal to decrease their own wage and as they
are all in the same situation, nothing prevents both the wage and the wage reference
from adjusting °exibly.
A fuller understanding of our comparative statics results is forthcoming if one traces
the e®ect of the two shocks on the equilibrium equations of Table 3. Let us consider ¯rst
the e®ects of a negative technology shock for ' = 0. (The analysis for the case of ' = 1
is performed in the next subsection.)
Assuming for the moment that e remains at its equilibrium level, the ¯rm needs
to decrease both n and w for the LD and the WS to hold after a negative technology
21The second equality is obtained by setting unemployment bene¯ts at their equilibrium value b = ½w.
This elasticity measure and the values in Table 4 should therefore be considered as approximations
around the benchmark equilibrium.
21shock. This is because the WS stipulates a positive relationship between w and n, and
a counterfactual increase in the two variables, and with it a further drop in y=n (by
the concavity of the production function), would violate the LD condition.22 Turning to
e®ort, the EC implies that workers decrease e because both y=n and the wage reference
are lower. This in turn ampli¯es the negative e®ect of the drop in A on y, n and w.
The same sequence of e®ects applies for the ¯xed price demand shock and this ex-
plains that the two types of shocks have similar e®ects (on n and w) in the external
reference case. For a given e, the ¯rm decreases n to meet the required drop in y. The
lower employment level triggers a fall in the wage reference and thus w, e and y=n all
decrease as implied by the WS, LD and EC curves. In addition, the EC and the WS
imply that the drop in w is relatively larger than the drop in y=n. As a result, real
marginal cost Ã also falls (by the LD). These adjustments are illustrated in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Comparative statics when ' = 0
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Note: Calibration as described in the text, in particular A = 1;® = :66;Ã = :9;n =
:95;º = :75;½ = :5
4.2.2 Purely internal reference
Turning to the purely internal reference case (' = 1) case, ¯rst observe that the wage
setting curve (combined with the production function), w = ¹ µ(Ae®n®¡1)º, is fundamen-
22This later point also explains why ¯rms decrease n by a relatively small amount (compared to w) so
as not to completely neutralize or even reverse the negative e®ect of A on y=n.
22tally di®erent from the corresponding equation in the external case. For a given level of






= (® ¡ 1) < 0.
Everything else constant, ¯rms thus accompany higher employment with lower instead of
higher wages. The central mechanism behind this result is diminishing marginal returns
of labor (0 < ® < 1). A decrease in employment ceteris paribus leads to an increase in
output per worker y=n. As a result, the reference wage in the worker's e®ort condition
falls and ¯rms lower wages to elicit optimal e®ort.
Another signi¯cant di®erence arises because the relationship between w and n is no
longer independent of other variables as was the case for ' = 0. Changes in A and/or
general equilibrium e®ects on e alter the productive situation of the ¯rm and thus output
per worker y=n. This implies that the wage setting curve itself, and not only the labor
demand curve, shifts in response to shocks.
To understand the impact of a negative technology shock in this case, it su±ces to
observe that the LD and WS curves form a system in w and y=n that is independent of
A. Technology shock therefore leave w, y=n and e unchanged as we found in Table 2b.
By contrast, exogenous changes in demand under ¯xed prices a®ect the ¯rm's real
marginal costs Ã. This additional margin shifts the LD but does not directly a®ect the
WS. Hence, w, y=n and e may all adjust in response to a demand shock. Assuming as
before that e initially remains at its equilibrium level, the drop in demand requires the
¯rm to decrease n, thus resulting in an increase in y=n. This increase in y=n leads the
¯rm to raise w. The increase in w, in turn, has the e®ect that workers step up their
e®ort level e (by the EC), thus amplifying the fall in n and the increase in y=n and w
(the WS shifts up). These adjustments are illustrated in Figure 3 where one sees that
the negative technology shock (left-hand panel) shifts down both LD and WS. On the
contrary, in the negative demand shock case, the general equilibrium increase in e shifts
upward both the WS and the LD { a reaction that is very di®erent from the purely
external case where the LD shifts down along the stable WS. Note that this asymmetric
move in n and w would occur even if the LD were to shift down after the demand shock
(which would be the case if the increase in e®ort were smaller and was outweighed by
the decrease in real marginal cost).
23Figure 3: Comparative statics when ' = 1
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Note: Calibration as described in the text, in particular A = 1;® = :66;Ã = :9;n =
:95;º = :75;½ = :5
4.3 Robustness
We assess the robustness of our benchmark model along two dimensions. First, we
report how the comparative statics change for di®erent calibrations of º and µ, the two
parameters for which we have little a priori evidence. Second, we consider an alternative
de¯nition of the worker's gift d(e;¢).
4.3.1 Robustness to alternative calibrations of º and µ
Tables 5a and 5b display the changes in y, n, w and e following a -1% technology shock
and a -1% demand shock when º = 0:5 and º = 0:9, respectively. All other parameters
are left at their benchmark calibration values. The following observations are worth
making. First, a higher value of º does not alter the reaction to a technology shock
when ' = 1, that is, in the internal reference case. In the case of a demand shock,
the reaction of all three endogenous variables, employment, wage and e®ort is ampli¯ed
24when º = :9. By contrast, the performance of the model with an entirely external
reference deteriorates with both shocks being met by a larger wage adjustment and a
smaller employment reaction. The intuition here is that the higher value of º makes
the outside wage reference even more responsive to general equilibrium e®ects. The
consequence is that the performance of the model where both perspectives are present
(and ' = :5) deteriorates somewhat quantitatively. Our previous message, however,
remains unchanged: the more rent-sharing matters in ¯rms' wage policy, the more wage
rigidity, internal ampli¯cation, and asymmetric responses to technology and demand
shocks the model implies.
Table 5a: Robustness to di®erent º for -1% technology shock
º = 0:5 º = 0:9
Value of ' y n w e y n w e
0 -2.38 -1.48 -0.91 -0.61 -1.95 -0.39 -1.56 -1.04
.5 -2.58 -1.95 -0.62 -0.44 -2.03 -0.56 -1.46 -1.00
1 -2.97 -2.97 0 0 -2.97 -2.97 0 0
Table 5b: Robustness to di®erent º for -1% demand shock
º = 0:5 º = 0:9
Value of ' y n w e y n w e
0 -1.00 -1.34 -0.82 -0.16 -1.00 -0.59 -2.31 -0.91
.5 -1.00 -1.63 -0.13 0.14 -1.00 -1.26 -0.52 -0.24
1 -1.00 -1.99 0.50 0.50 -1.00 -2.35 1.24 0.87
Tables 6a and 6b display the same information for alternative values of the parameter
µ: µ = 2:5 and µ = 0:5 (recall that µ > 2 for the model to have a positive equilibrium). A
larger µ increases the workers aversion to e®ort. The e®ort function thus becomes more
concave in its arguments, i.e. changes in w, y=n or wnb1¡n have a relatively smaller
e®ect on the supply of e®ort. Here as well there is no impact of this parameter change
in the case of a technology shock when ' = 1. In the case of a demand shock, all three
endogenous variables, n;w;e react less when µ increases. The changes are in the same
direction under a technology shock when ' = 0: an increase in µ decreases the reaction
of n;w and e. By contrast, a demand shock causes a larger decrease in both n and w
(but not e). These contrasted results imply that the comparative statics is little a®ected
by variations in µ when both perspectives are present (' = :5).
25Table 6a: Robustness to di®erent µ for -1% technology shock
µ = 2:5 µ = 5
Value of ' y n w e y n w e
0 -2.38 -0.90 -1.45 -1.20 -1.71 -0.64 -1.07 -0.43
.5 -2.51 -1.23 -1.26 -1.05 -1.92 -1.00 -0.89 -0.39
1 -2.97 -2.97 0 0 -2.97 -2.97 0 0
Table 6b: Robustness to di®erent µ for -1% demand shock
µ = 2:5 µ = 5
Value of ' y n w e y n w e
0 -1.00 -0.87 -1.45 -0.64 -1.00 -1.15 -1.90 -0.35
.5 -1.00 -1.43 -0.40 -0.07 -1.00 -1.49 -0.21 -0.01
1 -1.00 -2.65 1.26 1.18 -1.00 -1.76 0.58 0.27
4.3.2 Robustness to alternative de¯nition of the worker's gift
The second robustness check we perform concerns an alternative de¯nition of the worker's
gift to the ¯rm, d(e;¢). In section 3.1, we de¯ned this gift as d(e;¢) = An®¡1[e®¡¹c®=µ].
The presence of the An®¡1 term implies that the worker realizes that supplying e®ort is
less valuable to the ¯rm in low productivity situations and vice versa in high productivity
states. As we noted, this modeling choice is part of the explanation for the procyclicity
of e®ort in our model.
Yet, it seems also possible that the worker does not internalize the productivity
situation of the ¯rm when measuring his gift of e®ort. If this is the case, it may be more
appropriate to de¯ne the worker's gift to the ¯rm directly in terms of e®ort as in
d(e;¢) = G(e ¡ ¹c1=µ).
For simplicity and for lack of indication otherwise, we assume here that Ge is a constant
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with Q = µ=¸. As can be seen immediately, the y=n term in front of the gift of the ¯rm
towards the worker on the left-hand-side of this equation is replaced by e. Hence, the
¯rm's productive situation (i.e. An®¡1) no longer a®ects the worker's evaluation of the
gift to the ¯rm. At the same time, the fact that e®ort now enters linearly on the left-hand
side makes the supply of e®ort less concave. Everything else constant, movements in the
gift of the ¯rm therefore have a larger e®ect on e®ort than before.
26The change in the e®ort function hardly a®ects the rest of the model. The wage
setting curve in (10) remains exactly the same, while the labor demand takes on a









Tables 7a and 7b report the comparative statics with respect to a technology shock
for this alternative de¯nition of the e®ort function (all parameters are kept at their
benchmark calibration values).
Table 7a: Changes in endogenous variables following a 1% technology shock
(Alternative de¯nition of the gift of the worker - Various ')
Value of ' y n w e Ã y=n
0 -1.84 -0.69 -1.16 -0.58 0 -1.16
.5 -2.03 -1.02 -1.00 -0.55 0 -1.03
1 -2.97 -2.97 0 0 0 0
Table 7b: Changes in endogenous variables following a 1% demand shock
(Alternative de¯nition of the gift of the worker - Various ')
Value of ' y n w e Ã y=n
0 -1 -0.82 -1.37 -0.69 -1.18 -0.18
.5 -1 -1.20 -0.39 -0.30 -0.65 0.20
1 -1 -1.79 0.60 0.30 -0.20 0.81
In the case of a technology shock, the absence of the labor productivity e®ect on
the gift of e®ort outweighs the amplifying e®ect of the smaller curvature of the EC on
the supply of e®ort. E®ort therefore becomes less procyclical (unless, of course, ' = 1
in which case e®ort remains constant). This in turn reduces the internal ampli¯cation
mechanism and implies a smaller fall in output and labor productivity. As a result, both
wages and employment decrease by a smaller amount.
For the negative demand shock case, the relative forces are inverted: the amplifying
e®ect of the smaller curvature in the EC outweighs the absence of the labor productivity
e®ect on the gift of e®ort and e®ort becomes more procyclical. Employment therefore
needs to fall by less to meet the lower demand, and wages also become less procyclical.
Overall, these di®erences are quantitatively small and they do not alter the qualita-
tive message of our model: rent-sharing considerations promote wage rigidity, internal
ampli¯cation and asymmetric responses to technology and demand shocks.
275 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an explicit model of reciprocity in labor relations
suitable for inclusion in a macroeconomic general equilibrium setting. In line with the
evidence from experimental economics and ¯eld studies, our setup naturally features the
¯rm's ability to pay as one of the main determinants of e®ort. Taking workers' behavior
into account, ¯rms ¯nd it optimal to set wages at a level that depends not only on
workers' outside earning opportunities but also on their own pro¯tability. The resulting
form of rent sharing generates strong wage rigidity, signi¯cant asymmetries in reaction
to demand and supply shocks, and pro-cyclical e®ort.
Our reciprocity-based e±ciency wage model is not the ¯rst theory justifying a sharing
of the rent between workers and ¯rm owners. Notable are the insider-outsider model of
Lindbeck and Snower (1988) and the search and matching models of Diamond (1981)
and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). From this perspective, our model stands as a
complementary explanation for the pervasive micro-econometric evidence that the ¯rm's
ability to pay is an important determinant of wages. The implications of our view
on rent-sharing for cyclical macroeconomics are new, however. We show, in particular,
that, together with the assumption of diminishing marginal returns to labor, rent-sharing
arising from reciprocity has the potential to answer some of the outstanding puzzles in
the theory of economic °uctuations.
The lessons of our exercise may extend well beyond the speci¯cs of our model. Con-
sider the burgeoning literature on search and matching in the labor market, for example.
Rent-sharing in this context arises because a ¯rm-worker match creates a surplus that
the parties split according to some set bargaining rule. Labor productivity enters the
de¯nition of the threat point of the ¯rm while the outside option represents the threat
point of the worker. The resulting equation for wages bears a striking resemblance to
the wage setting equation of our model.23
Yet, recent papers by Hall (2003) and Shimer (2005) conclude that search and match-
ing models largely fail to generate quantitatively important responses to plausible exoge-
nous technology shocks and that wages remain much too volatile. Given the similarity
in the determinants of wage setting, it is interesting to ask what is the crucial di®erence
between our setting, which delivers rigidity, and the search and matching framework,
which does not. Part of the answer is the absence of diminishing marginal returns to
labor in the search and matching models. Firms in those models are small and can only
hire one worker. Changes in technology therefore translate one-to-one into changes in
23See, for example, equation 1.20 in Pissarides (2000)
28labor productivity, a fact that implies a strong response of wages and small responses
of employment and output to such shocks. By contrast, ¯rms in our model optimally
choose employment, and thus labor productivity (given that marginal returns to labor
are diminishing). Moreover the management of workers' e®ort in a context of reciprocity
leads ¯rms to neutralize most of the e®ect of the technology shock on labor productiv-
ity by suitably adjusting employment, thus avoiding suboptimal swings in wages. E®ort
management, in conjunction with diminishing marginal returns to labor, therefore gener-
ates substantially ampli¯ed responses in employment and output while changes in wages
remain comparatively small.
This analysis suggests that an interesting extension of our work would consist in
modifying the search and matching set-up to allow for large (multi-worker) ¯rms with
diminishing marginal returns to labor. Combining a thus-enriched search and match-
ing framework with the e±ciency wage considerations of this paper would bridge the
gap between alternative departures from the Walrasian labor supply paradigm and may
provide important new insights on the labor market. 24
Inserting our reciprocity-based e±ciency wage model into a dynamic general equilib-
rium setup is a second natural extension of our research. This undertaking will require
thinking more carefully about another dimension of the wage reference. Indeed, we have
made workers perfectly aware of the ¯rm's productivity and of their outside option. The
survey studies of Bewley (1999) and others, however, emphasize that often workers have
only limited information on these components of the wage reference. The dynamic gener-
alization of the present model will have to take a stance on these informational frictions.
It is plausible to assume that workers learn only gradually about supply and demand
shocks that a®ect productivity as well as their outside option. Such a learning process
may explain why workers often take their own past wage as a reference, a feature that,
in and of itself, would introduce persistence in the reactions to external shocks. Flesh-
ing out such a construct and working out its implications is the subject of our current
research.
24A recent study by Cahuc, Marque and Wasmer (2004) is a ¯rst step in this direction. These authors
combine Stole and Zwiebel's (1996) intra-¯rm bargaining model with search and matching frictions
and analyze how large ¯rms with diminishing marginal productivity of labor internalize the e®ect of
their employment decision on labor productivity and thus on the outcome of the wage bargaining. Their
research is, however, exclusively focused on the steady state implications of this construct in the presence
of di®erent types of labor.
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